What TRIP actually specifies

The unit of evidence. A CBOR map with nine fields, signed with Ed25519; the block hash is SHA-256 over the full encoding.

• ▸ index — position in the chain, contiguous from 0
• ▸ identity — Ed25519 public key of the attester
• ▸ timestamp — Unix seconds
• ▸ h3 cell + resolution — 7 to 10, default 10
• ▸ context digest — SHA-256 over h3 / time bucket / Wi-Fi / cell / IMU parts
• ▸ prev hash — previous block hash, null at genesis
• ▸ meta flags — including exploration sessions
• ▸ signature — covers the deterministic CBOR of fields 0–7

Rules that make fabrication expensive, applied identically on device and on the verifier.

• ▸ Consecutive breadcrumbs in the same H3 cell are rejected
• ▸ At most 10 breadcrumbs accumulate per cell
• ▸ Minimum interval 15 minutes; explicit exploration sessions may shorten it to 5
• ▸ Indices must be contiguous and each breadcrumb must reference the previous block hash
• ▸ Every breadcrumb carries its own Ed25519 signature

Breadcrumbs are never written to a chain. They are sealed into a Merkle root, and only that root is anchored.

• ▸ Default epoch size is 100 breadcrumbs
• ▸ The root commits to the ordered set, plus the count of unique cells
• ▸ The root is signed by the identity key
• ▸ Anchor targets are chain-agnostic; this implementation uses Base

The output a relying party actually consumes. Fifteen CBOR fields, signed by the verifier, containing statistics only.

• ▸ identity, issued-at, epoch count, breadcrumb and unique-cell counts
• ▸ α, β, κ, π and the criticality confidence
• ▸ trust score and validity window
• ▸ RP nonce — mandatory, binds the certificate to one request
• ▸ chain head hash — mandatory, binds it to one exact evidence set

The only mode this deployment promotes. A pre-recorded trajectory cannot answer a challenge that did not exist when it was captured.

• ▸ The relying party generates a 16-byte nonce
• ▸ The verifier pushes a challenge over a real-time channel
• ▸ The attester signs the nonce together with the chain head and expected index
• ▸ The verifier checks the response, then issues a PoH bound to that nonce

Any compliant implementation can act as a verifier with its own Ed25519 key; an attester may submit to several and a relying party picks whom to trust.

• ▸ There is no privileged verifier in the protocol
• ▸ The verifier publishes its key and policy at a well-known URL
• ▸ This project positions itself as the first public verifier, not the only one